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Abstract
This paper collects most recent developments in the emerging eco-
nomic sub-area Economics of Religion. According to ￿secularization
thesis￿, the importance of beliefs and religious activities should weaken
as education, scienti￿c knowledge and economic welfare increases. That
hypothesis has been previously proofed false, but it continues to a￿ect
people’s attitudes. This survey analyzes the economic consequences of
religion, the two-way interrelationship between religious and economic
activities and the present state of economic scrutiny on the subject,
exploring the emerging sub-￿eld of economics, which appends our no-
tion of factors behind the economic behavior and growth, by includ-
ing religious activity as an important factor in economic development.
Changes in belief systems, which in many cases will be forms of re-
ligion, also can signi￿cantly in￿uence individual behavior along with
the maximization of individual pro￿t and utility. The ￿nding that eco-
nomic growth depends also on the productivity of the religious sector,
o￿ers interesting future research opportunities.
¤University of Jyv￿skyl￿, School of Business and Economics, P.O.Box 35, FIN-40014
University of Jyv￿skyl￿, Finland. E-mail: eman@econ.jyu.￿
11 Introduction
Economics of religion is one emerging sub-area of contemporary economics.
That kind of analysis may enhance modern economic science by generat-
ing new information on ￿non-market￿ behavior. There has been a growing
interest into recognizing a larger role for cultural in￿uences in economic per-
formance. Microeconomics is based on the derivation of utility functions of
the economic agents. By appending those functions with beliefs, norms and
values gives a more realistic picture of the behavior of human beings. Re-
ligion, moral and culture a￿ect economic attitudes and activities, but those
factors are usually neglected in economic scrutiny.
The modern business company is shaped not only by its formal wage,
salary and other incentive systems but also by the content of its belief system.
The internal structure of informal incentives created by a business culture
may have a major impact on the ability of the ￿rm to make e￿cient use of
its resources. Similar things are now being said of whole national economic
systems. Besides relying on the inputs of capital and labor and the structure
of property rights and other legal arrangements, the functioning of a national
economy may depend on a host of less well de￿ned factors involving elements
of culture, which are a short distance to religion. Economists today are
being pushed to accept that they may have to take up the role of religion if
they want to understand the full workings of economic systems (Nelson 2001,
p.205-207). Religion is often a decisive in￿uence on the form of ￿social capital￿
of a society, which can be a key explanatory factor along with physical and
human capital in determining national economic outcomes.
Contrary to the popular notion in liberal ￿post-Christian￿ era Western-
European countries, importance of religions has not been fading away. As
contemporary examples we should note the explosive growth of protestant
and charismatic Christianity in Latin America, expansion and political im-
portance of Islamic fundamentalism and continuing importance of evangeli-
cal Christianity in the world’s largest economy, in the US. This emphasis is
2deepening due to the presidency of G.W.Bush1. Additionally, the religious
ferment continues in Russia and Eastern-Europe.
Religion of economics is usually (Iannaccone 1998, p.1466) divided into
three major lines of scienti￿c scrutiny:
￿ Analysis of economic consequences of religions.
￿ Analysis of religious behavior from an economic perspective, applying
microeconomic theory and econometric techniques.
￿ Analysis and critique of the development of economic theory and prac-
tice from the perspective of theology and sacred writings. This sub-area
is also called religious economics.
The last one, religious economics, is pretty much an area of its own,
which covers huge amount of writings by Christian theologians (analyzing
for example problems of usury, private ownership, economic concepts in the
writings of Bible, etc.) and Islamic economists (analyzing banking, taxation,
income distribution and ￿nance based on Qur’an and Sunna).
Additionally, one interesting line of study is the way of seeing economics
as the basis for a contemporary religion, as economists can be seen to serve as
the priesthood of a modern secular religion of economic progress that serves
many of the same functions in contemporary society as earlier Christian
and other religions did in their time (Nelson 2001). This ￿eld of analyzing
economic’s rhetoric aspects could be called economic theology. According
to this view, we live in a world in which science has replaced religion as
the most powerful of orthodoxies. Economics is not value-free, but contains
hidden metaphysics.
In this paper, the analysis concentrates on discussing the current state
of economic scrutiny concerning the economic consequences of religion. Re-
ligion is de￿ned (Iannaccone 1998) as any shared set of beliefs, activities
1see cover story ￿Bush and God￿ in Newsweek, March 10 issue, 2003
3and institutions premised upon faith in supernatural forces. This de￿ni-
tion excludes purely individualistic spirituality and systems of metaphysical
thought, including some variant beliefs, which border on pure philosophy.
Nowadays, studies on economics of religion are appearing on for example
nature of religion, the determinants of individual religiosity, participation
rates, religious mobility, commitment, evolution of religious institutions, sec-
ularization, socioeconomic correlates of sect membership, church-state prob-
lems and economic consequences of religion. Economics of religion sustains
at least four international journals, four associations, three annual meetings
in the US and Europe. These new market models of religious activity have
already been characterized as a new paradigm. Most AEA conferences now
include sessions on religion.
Religion continues to be of importance in people’s lives. So called ￿sec-
ularization thesis￿, which came to function as the principal paradigm for
the social-scienti￿c study of religion states that religion is merely a survival
from man’s primitive past2, and will disappear during the development of
science and human race. One prominent developer of that kind of positivist
view was sociologist Gerhard Lenski3. The hypothesis implies that religious
activity must decline as science and technology advance. Increasing level
of education makes individuals less religious and more skeptical on faith-
based claims. The same argumentation leads to notion that membership in
deviant religious groups (sects, cults, etc.) is the consequence of indoctri-
nation leading to aberrant values, or abnormal psychology due to trauma,
neurosis or unmet needs. That kind of argumentation is still common, even
when decades of research has repeatedly proved them false (Iannaccone 1998,
pp.1468-1472).
Larson, E. and Witham, L. (1998,1997) have examined the religious activ-
ity among the American scientists. They ￿nd out that anti-religious opinions
are not much more common among the highly educated professors, except
2the origin of the secularization thesis can be traced at least to Marx and Weber
3Lenski, Gerhard E. 1963. The Religious Factor. Rev.ed.Garden City, NY:Doubleday.
4among the social sciences (psychology, anthropology, sociology), where secu-
larization thesis has gained more popularity. Nevertheless, American scien-
tists generally are not found to be less religious now as in 1916 (Larson &
Witham 1997). Eminent US psychologist J.H. Leuba, made a survey on this
topic in 19144, and found out that 58% of 1,000 randomly selected US sci-
entists expressed disbelief or doubt in the existence of God. Leuba repeated
the study in 1934 5 and found that percentage had increased to 67. In 1997
study, Larson and Witham repeated the study and found out that percent-
age was 61, implicating no major increase in disbelief. On the other hand,
when the study was restricted to include only US ￿top￿ scientists (Larson &
Witham 1998), members of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), per-
centage of disbelief into existence of personal God was clearly higher, 72%.
This survey focuses on empirical analysis on themes of economics of re-
ligion, so the focus is mainly on Judeo-Christian type of beliefs, as that is
the dominating basis on religious activities in Western hemisphere. That
means also that the data is almost entirely available and collected among
Western countries. Availability of religious data in the US has previously
been somewhat limited and unreliable. The situation in Finland is better
than in most other countries as we have a one common state-church which
has been collecting data from its parishioners (covering almost entirely the
whole population) for centuries. Overall, religious data is more abundant
than maybe economists have previously realized and surely far more exten-
sive than those pertaining to many other ￿non-market￿ activities , such as
clubs, sport activities, social movements and other third-sector institutions.
2 Religion and economic behavior
The founding writing on the economic consequences of religion is Max We-
ber’s Die Protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus, where he ar-
4Leuba, J.H. 1916. The Belief in God and Immortality: A Psychological, Anthropolog-
ical and Statistical Study. Sherman, French&CO., Boston
5Leuba, J.H. 1934. Harper’s Magazine 169, 291-300
5gues that the Protestant Reformation made possible the advance of modern
capitalism. Protestantism made a previously unseen emphasis on individ-
ual responsibility, personal diligence and approved risk-taking and ￿nancial
self-improvement (Weber 1904, engl. 1930). Nevertheless, there is mixed
empirical evidence backing the Protestant Ethic thesis. On the contrary, it
has been shown6 that most capitalist institutions preceded the Protestant
Reformation. During the beginning of modern capitalism, it also seem to
be that economic progress in Europe was uncorrelated with Protestant reli-
gion, in a sense that in Netherland, Catholic families had more wealth than
Protestants. Nevertheless, several scholars7 note that Christian religion over-
all has enabled rapid economic growth, versus the economic and intellectual
development in Islamic countries for most of millennium. This is explained
to depend on Islam’s static world-view. Especially Protestantism is found
to be positively correlated with growth and development8. It should also be
remembered, that the empirical evidence only rejects the speci￿c channel pro-
posed by Weber (Guiso, Sapienza & Zingales 2003), not a more general link
between the Protestant ethic and the development of a capitalist attitude.
Weber’s (1904, engl. 1930) main thesis was that religion may be a signi￿-
cant positive or negative force on economic development. The e￿ect would be
positive if religion looked favorably on the accumulation of material wealth,
6Samuelsson, K. 1993. Religion and Economic Action. The Protestant Ethic, the Rise
of Capitalism, and the Abuses of Scholarship. U of Toronto Press;
Anderson, and Tollison, R., 1992. Morality and Monopoly. The Constitutional Political
Economy of Religious Rulers. Cato J., 12:2;
Delacroix, 1992. A Critical Empirical Test of the Common Interpretation of the Protestant
Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Int. Assoc. Business & Society, Belgium;
Tawney, R.H., 1926. Religion and the Rise of Capitalism. New York
7Greif, A. 1994. Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society. J.of Political Econ-
omy, 102:5;
Kuran 1997. Islam and Underdevelopment. J.of Instit.&Theor.Econ.153:1;
Kuran 1995. Private Truths, Public Lies. Harvard University Press;
Chiswick, B. 1983. The Earnings and Human Capital of American Jews. J.Human Res.,
18:3
8Grier 1997
6perhaps in conjunction with rewards obtained in an after-life. This argu-
mentation could ￿t into Calvinist Protestantism. Weber argued that the
Protestant ethic is inherently about applying religious meaning to economic
behavior, as for example, labor was seen as a moral duty. However, as Keely
notes (Keely 2003, p.286), Weber otherwise downplayed the role of religious
beliefs in determining economic performance. He claimed that capitalism
did not rely on the Protestant ethic, but rather needed only the initial push
of the ethic and afterwards any work ethic remaining is devoid of religious
meaning.
The logic of e￿ect mechanism is that a cultural trait a￿ects certain values
or beliefs, and those beliefs in turn in￿uence one’s economic decision-making
and thus economic outcomes. The possible association of cultural factors
(religion as a proxy with good data resources for empirical analysis purposes)
with di￿erences in economic performance is assumed.
Religion can also increase economic development by promoting a positive
attitude toward honesty. Religion may increase levels of trust and reduce
levels of corruption and criminal activity, increase a nation’s openness to
strangers and thus make the economy more open to foreign investments and
employees. Religion may encourage thrift, which would stimulate saving,
investments and therefore economic growth. At the same time, religion may
lead to better health levels (by discouraging ￿sinful￿ activities as drugs, over-
eating, gambling, alcohol, etc.). Higher health levels in the society would
raise productivity through labor force e￿ciency.
Negative factors could be religious restrictions on capital accumulation,
pro￿t-making, credit markets and interest. Religion may also increase re-
source allocation towards church activities (cathedral building) and there-
fore removing resources from free market activities. Violent behavior or civil
unrest may either increase or decrease because of religion.
At the same time it has been found that at the level of individuals and
households, economic behavior and outcomes do correlate with religion. Even
more stronger links exist between religiosity and a wide range of economi-
7cally relevant social behavior, such as criminal activity, drug and alcohol
consumption, physical and mental health, marriage, fertility and divorce.
US Jews have an average signi￿cantly higher wages and income as Chris-
tian population, largely due to their high levels of education9. Brenner and
Kiefer (1981)10 argue that in response to long-continuing persecution, Jews
emphasize the value of education, as it is portable and non-expropriable ver-
sus land or physical capital. Chiswick (1983, 1985) notes that Jews acquire
high levels of education because of their high rate of return on schooling.
This high rate of return is due to large investments in child quality, seen in
small family size and mothers’ tendency to stay home when raising children.
Also Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2003) ￿nd out that religious beliefs, espe-
cially Christian religion, are positively associated with attitudes conductive
to economic growth, free markets and better institutions. On the negative
side, religious people are found to be more intolerant and less sympathetic
to women’s rights.
Religious e￿ects on economic behavior are found to be substantively large
and statistically signi￿cant (Iannaccone 1998, pp.1475-1476), but the possi-
bility remains that religion’s statistical e￿ect is spurious. There exists un-
derlying characteristics that form both religious and other activities. Well-
behaving children may avoid drugs, stay in school and go to church. People
with liberal values will probably stay away from conservative denominations.
Nevertheless, there exist plausible a priori arguments for religion’s impact.
Freeman (1986)11 has noted that churchgoing positively a￿ects the allocation
9Chiswick, B. 1983. The Earnings and Human Capital of American Jews. Journal of
Human Research. 18:3, 313-336;
Chiswick, B. 1985. The Labor Market Status of American Jews. Patterns and Determi-
nants. American Jewish Yearbook, 85. 131-153
10Brenner, R. and Kiefer, N.M. 1981. The Economics of the Diaspora. Discrimination
and Occupational Structure. Econ.Develop.Cult.Change. 29:3. 517-534
11Freeman, R.B. 1986. Who Escapes? The Relation of Churchgoing and Other Back-
ground Factors to the Socioeconomic Performance of Black Male Youths from Inner-city
Tracts. In The Black Youth employment Crisis by Richard B. Freeman and Harry J.
Holzer, (eds.) Chicago and London. University of Chicago Press, pp.353-376
8of time, school attendance, work activity and the frequency of socially deviant
activity (crime, drugs, alcohol) and that at least some part of the churchgo-
ing e￿ect is the result of an actual causal impact. Several other economists
12 have observed signi￿cantly lower rates of violent and nonviolent crime in
geographical areas with higher rates of religious membership.
There exists a large empirical literature on the relationship between reli-
gion and di￿erent forms of sociological deviance13 (including crime, suicide,
divorce, drugs, non-marital sex, etc.). Typical result from these analyzes
is that youth raised in highly religious homes are less likely to engage in
criminal activity, use drugs or alcohol, or engage in premarital sex. E￿ects
are found to be especially strong for children raised in strict denominations
or religiously homogenous communities. Empirical studies consistently ￿nd
that high rates of religious activity and commitment are linked with mental
health, reduced stress and increased life satisfaction. Religious e￿ects seem to
persist even after controlling the models for age, income, gender, education,
etc. Several epidemiological studies on statistically signi￿cant religious e￿ects
are reported in several medicine journals. Members of strict religious groups
(Mormons, 7th Day Adventists, etc.) seem to enjoy longer lives and lower
rates of cancer, stroke, hypertension and heart disease, because they follow
several health-related every-day restrictions. Broader correlations between
health and religiosity have many causes, including a negative link between
faith and stress, or a positive link between church involvement and social
support14.
A signi￿cant relationship between religion and economically relevant be-
havior does not straightforwardly imply similar relationship between religion
12Lipford, McCormick, R. and Tollison, 1993. Preaching Matters. J. Econ Behav.
Organ. 21:3;
Hull and Bold, F.(1995). Preaching Matters ￿ Replication and Extension. J. Econ Behav.
Organ. 27:1
13for a good survey on literature, see (Iannaccone 1998, p.1476-1478)
14Levin, J.S. 1994. Religion and Health. Is there an Association, is it valid and is it
causal? Soc.Sci.Med. 38.11.pp.1475-1482
9and economic attitudes. The degree of religiosity is not found to in￿uence
consumer’s attitudes concerning capitalism, socialism, income redistribution,
private property, free trade and government regulation. Every religious tra-
dition and sacred literature seem to contain enough ambiguity to justify any
number of economic positions. Iannaccone (1998) notes that despite me-
dia hype concerning the conservatism of the ￿Religious Right￿, opinion polls
consistently ￿nd that the economic attitudes of those groups are no more
conservative than those of other Protestants. On several dimensions (income
redistributions, aid to the poor) they are signi￿cantly less conservative than
the average American. Their conservatism is expressed in a set of theological,
moral and social issues (school prayer, abortion, sexual conduct), but which
are independent of their economic attitudes.
Religions economic impact seems to be signi￿cant, but not uniform. Reli-
gion a￿ects strongly some behavioral outcomes. Life satisfaction is related to
levels of religious belief and physical health and deviance is strongly related
to levels of involvement. On the other hand, religious activity has no uniform
or equally strong e￿ect related to some other variables (earnings, education,
economic attitudes). Many e￿ects vary across denominations, which are usu-
ally strongest in sectarian groups. This lack of uniformity is seen as a proof
against spurious correlation due to any simple form of omitted heterogeneity.
Religious e￿ects do not reduce to a single unobserved factor, such as good-
ness, conservatism, credulity or risk aversion, which implies a need for more
sophisticated models of religious behavior and economy (Iannaccone 1998,
p.1478).
Barro and McCleary (2002) ￿nd out that macroeconomic development
(measured as GNP) has a negative correlation with religious activity, mea-
sured both by church attendance and various religious beliefs. Nevertheless,
when other development indicator were held constant, relation between GNP
and church attendance was positive, but not statistically signi￿cant. But us-
ing individual dimensions of economic development, as education, gives a
di￿erent picture. They found a clearly signi￿cant positive coe￿cient for
10education in all regressions (using SURE-system estimation technique) for
church attendance and beliefs. This means that beliefs do not rely on igno-
rance or non-scienti￿c thinking (contrary to Hume (1757)). Beliefs require
capacity, gained by education, for abstraction, as beliefs are based on faith
and non-materialized assumptions. Barro and McCleary (2002) test also for
the presence of secular trends in religiosity for given values of the economic
variables. The only statistically signi￿cant trend is a positive trend for belief
in hell.
Life expectancy was also found to have a negative relation with religiosity.
People defer investments in churchgoing when they are far away from their
anticipated deaths. But church attendance does not carry over to religious
beliefs in this time. Life expectancy had a positive relation to religious beliefs
(beliefs in heaven, hell and an after-life). The individuals who are further
away from death may have low incentives to spend time at church, but they
apparently need not have low levels of religious conviction. Analyzing the
e￿ects of the age structure has been pretty ambiguous. The higher population
share of children in the society is found to be positively related to church
attendance, but no relation is found with religious beliefs. Old-age fraction
was, somewhat surprisingly, not signi￿cantly related to church attendance
(Barro & McCleary 2002). This ￿nding is in line with the ambiguity in the
theory, whereby the elderly would wish to attend church more often because
of their impending deaths, but at the same time, would face high costs for
attending church meetings. Additionally, the share of elderly population was
negatively related to religious beliefs, which is not explained in a theory.
3 Religion and economic growth
According to Barro (Barro & McCleary 2002, p.15), the current state of eco-
nomic growth analysis is such that explanations of economic performance
have to go beyond narrow measures of economic variables to encompass
political and social factors. The empirical growth research reveal impor-
11tant in￿uences on growth from policies and institutions. Economic growth
models should also include variables for nation’s culture, moral and ethics
(Barro 2000). Probably the best proxy for that is religion, as it is well
documented for a long time in all western economies, making quantitative
empirical data available and closely measuring quanti￿able dimensions of
culture.
Based on the previous economic growth models by Barro15, in Barro and
McCleary (2002) the growth rate of per capita GDP is analyzed by using reli-
gious variables as explanatory variables. The ￿rst ￿nding was that di￿erences
in the composition of the population among the major religious denomina-
tions (Muslim, Protestant, Hindu, Eastern, Jewish, Orthodox, other) have
only little consequence for economic growth. Other, and more interesting,
￿nding is that religion seems to a￿ect economic growth (but not the other
way around). In Barro’s growth model, coe￿cient on church attendance was
signi￿cantly negative, whereas that on beliefs was signi￿cantly positive. The
implication is that the main growth e￿ect is a positive response to an in-
crease in religious believing relative to religious attending. This ￿nding is
understandable if believing is seen as the fundamental output of the reli-
gion sector. Economic growth is then positively related to the productivity
of the religion sector in the sense of the level of belief expressed relative to
sectoral inputs, which include the level of church attendance. The analysis
support the notion that an increase in religious beliefs or a decrease in church
attendance tend to stimulate also economic growth.
4 Conclusion
The contemporary research literature on the economic e￿ects of religion can
be divided into macro and micro studies. Macro analysis focuses on cross-
country studies, but their drawback is that there are too many institutional
di￿erences across countries and too few degrees of freedom to identity the
15Barro 1997,2000
12speci￿c e￿ects of religion separately. On micro level, the e￿ects of religion on
economic outcomes are analyzed inside one country area. Problems with
these studies contain endogeneity of religious variables, unclear causality
property and poor generalization of the results to other countries. Addi-
tionally, they focus on the correlation between religion and outcomes, not
attitudes.
The greater study activity of religious in￿uences on national economic
outcomes, as part of the accepted subject matter of professional economic
science, has many important implications. Inclusion of religious activity
and beliefs o￿er insightful addition to traditional analysis of economic be-
havior and growth. The ￿nding that economic growth depends also on the
productivity of the religious sector (Barro & McCleary 2002), o￿ers inter-
esting future research opportunities. When extended to country level (as
for Finland with good amount of data available), understanding on the na-
ture and amount of interrelationship between economics and religions will be
improved. It would also be interesting to study further how the process of
economic development in￿uences the role of organized religion in a country’s
political and legal structure, including the propensity to have state religious.
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